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Abstract 
Bird (2007) argues that scientific progress consists in increasing knowledge. Dellsén (2016a) 
objects that increasing knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific progress, 
and argues that scientific progress rather consists in increasing understanding. Dellsén also 
contends that unlike Bird’s view, his view can account for the scientific practices of using 
idealizations and of choosing simple theories over complex ones. I argue that Dellsén’s 
criticisms against Bird’s view fail, and that increasing understanding cannot account for 
scientific progress, if acceptance, as opposed to belief, is required for scientific understanding. 
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1. Introduction 
Alexander Bird (2007) defends the epistemic approach to scientific progress, according to 
which scientific progress consists in increasing knowledge. Finnur Dellsén (2016a) proposes 
an original alternative approach to scientific progress which he calls the noetic approach.1 
According to the noetic approach, scientific progress consists in increasing understanding. He 
argues that the noetic approach is superior to the epistemic approach. This paper aims to 
defend the epistemic approach from Dellsén’s criticisms2 and to criticize the noetic approach. 
There are other approaches to scientific progress in the literature. They are the semantic 
approach (Niiniluoto, 1980; 2014) and the problem-solving approach (Kuhn, 1962/1970; 
Laudan, 1977; 1984), but these approaches fall outside the scope of this paper. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, I spell out the epistemic and noetic 
approaches, and then reply to referees’ objections to the epistemic approach. In Section 3, I 
attempt to refute Dellsén’s contention that there can be scientific progress and an increase in 
understanding, even without any accumulation of knowledge. In Section 4, I attempt to 
confute his contention that even if there is an accumulation of knowledge, there can be no 
scientific progress and no increase in understanding. In Sections 5 and 6, I reply to his 
objections that the noetic approach accounts for, while the epistemic approach cannot, the 
scientific practices of using idealizations and of choosing simple theories over complex ones. 
 
                                           
1 ‘Noetic’ comes from the Greek ‘nous’ which means understanding (Dellsén, 2016: 72, footnote 2). 
2 See Darrell Rowbottom (2010), Ilkka Niiniluoto (2015), and Juha Saatsi (2016) for other criticisms against the 
epistemic approach. 
2 
 
2. Epistemic and Noetic Approaches 
Bird says that “an episode in science is progressive when at the end of the episode there is 
more knowledge than at the beginning” (2007: 64). He also says that “progress is made when 
certain means to an end are achieved” (2007: 83). So the epistemic approach comes down to 
the suggestion that scientific progress consists in increasing knowledge or in achieving a 
means to increase knowledge. Let me call the second part of the epistemic approach the 
means-end thesis. It implies that an episode is progressive, even if there is no more 
knowledge at the end of it than there was at the beginning of it, insofar as it paves the way for 
the production of knowledge in subsequent research. Suppose for the sake of argument that 
the history of science was filled with discarded theories, that past scientists did not generate 
knowledge, including observational knowledge, and that they kept researching despite 
repeated failures. Even so, they made progress, as long as their practices will contribute to the 
generation of knowledge in subsequent researches.3 
How would critics respond to the means-end thesis? They might object that the thesis is 
too permissive (referee). Not everything that promotes the accumulation of scientific 
knowledge counts as scientific progress. For example, technological advances and increased 
funding for scientific research promote the growth of scientific knowledge, but hardly count 
as scientific progress in the relevant sense. It is not clear on what grounds the means-end 
thesis excludes those developments that promote knowledge but do not count as scientific 
progress. 
     My response to this objection is to point out that the debate over scientific progress is 
restricted to those episodes that involve cognitive changes. Increased funding is not an 
episode that involves a cognitive change. Unlike increased funding, confirming a hypothesis 
is an episode that involves a cognitive change. So increased funding might be called a non-
cognitive episode; confirming a hypothesis might be called a cognitive episode. Participants 
in the debate over scientific progress are in the business of determining whether a cognitive 
episode is progressive or not, not whether a non-cognitive episode is progressive or not. In 
light of this observation, let me formulate the epistemic approach more precisely as the view 
that a cognitive episode in science is progressive, if and only if it involves the increase in 
knowledge or the acquisition of a means to increase knowledge. 
Critics might also object that the means-end thesis makes it difficult to discriminate, 
within the whole of the activities that are referred to as ‘scientific inquiry,’ the episodes that 
count as instances of cognitive progress (another referee). Indeed, in light of the means-end 
thesis, far too many things seem to count as progress. Epistemists would view the mere fact 
that scientists keep researching despite repeated mistakes as progressive. Given how broad 
the notion of progress becomes in view of the means-end thesis, it seems legitimate to ask 
what part or phase of scientific inquiry would not count as progress on the epistemic 
account.  
My response to this worry is to admit that there can be an epistemological problem 
over whether a cognitive episode does or does not serve as a means to obtain knowledge. 
This epistemological problem, however, does not denigrate the means-end thesis. To use an 
analogy, the correspondence theory of truth holds that a statement is true if and only if it 
corresponds to a state of affairs. There can be an epistemological problem over whether a 
particular statement corresponds to a state of affairs or not. This epistemological problem, 
                                           
3  Bird conjectures, a referee points out, that “the relevant developments that promote knowledge will 
themselves be knowledge” (2007, 84). In my view, however, Bird seems to mean gathering observational 
knowledge by ‘the relevant developments.’ In any event, the epistemic approach requires only the mean-end 
thesis. 
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however, does not denigrate the correspondence theory of truth. It is one thing to propose a 
criterion to distinguish between true and false statements; it is another whether we have 
enough evidence or not to tell whether a particular statement is true or false. Similarly, it is 
one thing to propose a criterion to distinguish between progressive and non-progressive 
episodes; it is another whether we have enough evidence or not to tell whether a particular 
episode is progressive or non-progressive. The referee’s objection, however, shows that when 
epistemists claim that a cognitive episode is progressive, they have the burden to show that 
there is an increase in knowledge in the episode, or that the episode serves as a stepping stone 
for the growth of knowledge in subsequent research. 
Let me turn to Dellsén’s conception of scientific understanding. He says that an “agent 
has partial scientific understanding of a given target just in case she grasps how to correctly 
explain and/or predict some aspects of the target in the right sort of circumstances” (2016a: 
75). An explanation is “correct even though it appeals to theories that are strictly speaking 
false, e.g. idealizations and simplifications, provided that those theories help identify the 
explanatorily relevant factors on which the explanandum depends” (Dellsén, 2016a: 75). In 
addition, “the explanatorily/predictively essential elements of a theory must be true in order 
for the theory to provide grounds for understanding” (Dellsén, 2016a: 73, footnote). 
The foregoing conception of scientific understanding is built into the noetic approach, 
according to which “scientific progress consists in increasing understanding,” and “an 
episode in science is progressive precisely when scientists grasp how to correctly explain or 
predict more aspects of the world at the end of the episode than at the beginning” (Dellsén, 
2016a: 73). The noetic approach does not embed the means-thesis (referee). Dellsén states 
explicitly that “since nearly anything can promote progress, we must be careful not to 
confuse scientific progress itself with the promotion of such progress” (2016a: 73). So he 
would not say that an episode is progressive on the grounds that a means to increase 
understanding is gained in the episode. 
Let me apply the noetic approach to the series of the three theories of diseases in the 
history of science. The humoral theory, the miasma theory, and the germ theory hold, 
respectively, that a disease results from an imbalance of the four humors, from a noxious air, 
and from germs. If the germ theory is true, the humoral theory and the miasma theory failed 
to identify the explanatorily relevant factors. The noetic approach, however, implies that there 
was scientific progress in the transition from the humoral theory to the miasma theory, 
provided that the miasma theory predicted more phenomena than the humoral theory. 
According to the noetic approach, scientific progress requires not both increasing 
explanations and predictions, but increasing explanations or predictions. 
 
3. Is Knowledge Necessary for Scientific Progress? 
Philip Kitcher (2002), Peter Lipton (2004), and Stephen Grimm (2006, 2014) claim that 
belief and justification are essential components of understanding. Dellsén, however, rejects 
their view, arguing that understanding requires neither belief nor justification, and that in 
certain cases in science, there is no increase in knowledge, but there is an increase in 
understanding, and the increase in understanding matches scientific progress. In other words, 
what is necessary for scientific progress is not increasing knowledge but increasing 
understanding. I flesh out and criticize Dellsén’s argument for this contention in this section. 
Dellsén argues that belief is not required for understanding, and that scientific progress 
consists in increasing understanding, so increasing knowledge is not necessary for scientific 
progress. So we need to examine how he argues that understanding does not require belief. 
He (2016b: 10) appeals to L. Jonathan Cohen’s (1992) distinction between belief and 
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acceptance. For Cohen, to believe p is to feel it to be true, and to accept p is to adopt the 
policy of including p “among one’s premises for deciding what to do or think in a particular 
context” (1992: 4). To use Cohen’s example, a lawyer may accept that her client is innocent 
in court. Once she accepts the proposition, she can infer that the prosecutor’s witness is not 
reliable, and can speak to the judge accordingly. Just as the lawyer merely accepts the 
proposition, so a physicist may merely accept string theory, and then use it “to explain any 
fundamental physical phenomena just as well as someone who also believes string theory” 
(Dellsén, 2016b: 11). It is not required that agents believe that theories are true – they “may 
merely assume or accept that they are true for the purposes of explanation and or prediction” 
(Dellsén, 2016a: 76). In short, “understanding something may merely involve treating certain 
propositions or theories as given in the context of explaining something, as opposed to being 
disposed to feel that the propositions or theories are true” (Dellsén, 2016b: 10). 
Contrary to what Dellsén claims, however, scientific understanding does require belief. 
In science, a tragic result may occur, if understanding lacks belief. Imagine that you are a 
scientist, and that you tested the hypothesis that the low intake of folic acid during pregnancy 
increases the chance of having premature babies. You studied one hundred pregnant women. 
The half and the other half of them took, respectively, less than two hundred micrograms and 
more than three hundred micrograms of folic acid a day during pregnancy. It turned out that 
twenty women of the first group and four women of the second group gave birth to premature 
babies. Now, you submit your research paper to a scientific journal. The editors ask, “Are the 
one hundred pregnant women in your study real or imaginary?” You answer, “I don’t know 
whether they are real or imaginary. I don’t believe they are real. But I accept that they are real. 
If we adopt the policy of using that assumption for the purpose of explanation, we can 
understand why the twenty women had premature babies.” The editors will be perplexed by 
your answer. They have two possible responses to you. One is kind; the other is unkind. Their 
kind response is to let you know that science is an inquiry into the world, but that they 
suspect that your manuscript is not an outcome of an inquiry into the world. Their unkind 
response is to accuse you of having fabricated data, a serious violation of research ethics in 
science. Of course, you did not fabricate the data, and the data are true. But the point is that if 
you do not believe that they are true, you are opening yourself to the charge of the serious 
misconduct, and to the charge that your understanding does not reflect the world. Belief plays 
such a crucial role in science. 
When scientists explain something in terms of a scientific theory, they believe that it is 
real. For example, when they invoke Newtonian mechanics to explain why the Earth turns 
around the Sun, they believe that the Earth turns around the Sun.4 If they do not believe that 
something is real, they do not bother to explain it. It is for this reason that biologists do not 
bother to explain why a unicorn has a horn, and that Ptolemaic astronomers did not bother to 
explain why the Earth revolves around the Sun. If scientists explain something that they do 
not believe to be real, they face a disconcerting question: “What is the point of explaining 
something you do not believe to be real?” Thus, it is in part because scientists believe that 
their explananda are real that their peers take their explanations seriously. 
How about predictions? Suppose that you are a scientist and use Newtonian mechanics 
to send a rocket to the Moon. You predict that the rocket will arrive on the Moon at a 
particular time. Before you confirm the prediction, you may merely accept it. Once you 
                                           
4 Should they believe that Newtonian mechanics is true? Dellsén would say no, but I (2015: 226-228; 2016: 77-
78; 2017: 59-60) argue that problems arise when we explain something in terms of a scientific theory without 
believing that it is (approximately) true. This paper, however, assumes for the sake of argument that Dellsén is 
right, i.e., that it is legitimate merely to accept a scientific theory and then use it to explain phenomena. 
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confirm it, however, you believe it. If you still merely accept it, you can be accused of 
making no discrimination between confirmed and unconfirmed predictions, and more 
importantly, your peers might dismiss your prediction, saying, “Why should I believe what 
you don’t?” They may even suspect that you have fabricated data. Thus, it is in part because 
scientists believe that their predictions are true that their peers take their predictions seriously. 
To summarize, scientists believe at least that explained phenomena are real, and that 
their confirmed predictions are true. In the absence of such beliefs, their peers might suspect 
that their explanations and predictions do not concern the world, and that their understandings, 
which allegedly arise from their explanations and predictions, do not reflect the world. Thus, 
it is not acceptance but belief that is required for scientific understanding. 
Let me now turn to Dellsén’s contention that understanding does not require 
justification. The idea is that understanding results from explanations and predictions making 
use of propositions, and that understanding can arise without any justification for the 
propositions. He states this view as follows: 
 
..there is no requirement in (U) that an agent has epistemic justification for the propositions on 
which her understanding is based. More precisely, an agent may partially understand something 
by virtue of grasping how to correctly explain or predict some aspect of it, even though she does 
not have the epistemic justification required for knowing the propositions to which she appeals 
in her explanations/predictions. (2016a: 76) 
 
In order to illustrate this point, Dellsén (2016a: 76) offers the example of Einstein’s 
explanation of Brownian motion in terms of the kinetic theory. He cites Einstein’s following 
paragraph: 
 
In this paper it will be shown that according to the molecular-kinetic theory of heat, bodies of 
microscopically-visible size suspended in a liquid will perform movements of such magnitude 
that they can be easily observed in a microscope, on account of the molecular motions of heat. It 
is possible that the movements to be discussed here are identical with the so-called “Brownian 
molecular motion”; however, the information available to me regarding the latter is so lacking in 
precision, that I can form no judgment in the matter. (Einstein, 1905/1956: 1) 
 
Einstein did not have enough information to determine whether the movements under 
investigation were Brownian motion, so “the explanandum in Einstein’s explanation of 
Brownian motion did not constitute knowledge for Einstein at the time” (Dellsén, 2016a: 76). 
In addition, “the kinetic theory of heat was very much up for debate at the turn of the 20th 
century, with many physicists favoring alternative theories of heat that did not assume the 
existence of submicroscopic molecules” (Dellsén, 2016a: 76). In short, Einstein was neither 
justified in believing that the explanandum was true, nor justified in believing that the 
explanans was true. Yet, he explained Brownian motion in terms of the kinetic theory, thereby 
giving rise to the understanding of Brownian motion and making scientific progress. 
Therefore, there can be an advance in scientific understanding and progress without 
justification. 
Does this episode spell doom for the epistemic approach? Epistemists would argue that 
Einstein believed that a certain phenomenon existed although he was not sure whether it was 
Brownian motion or not. He did not call the phenomenon Brownian motion because the name 
‘Brownian motion’ was a theory-laden term presupposing the existence of microscopic 
particles. Moreover, he made scientific progress simply because his insight into the 
relationship between the kinetic theory and Brownian motion served as a means to establish 
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the existence of molecules in the subsequent research by Jean Perrin in 1908. Thus, the 
aforementioned means-end thesis can be utilized to defend the epistemic approach from 
Dellsén’s objection. 
Let me now turn to another example from Dellsén (2016a: 80). It involves Alfred 
Wegener’s continental drift theory. Intuitively speaking, Wegener made scientific progress 
when he advanced the continental drift theory in the early twentieth century. The epistemic 
approach, however, incorrectly implies that he did not on the grounds that his theory was not 
supported by sufficient evidence. By contrast, the noetic approach correctly implies that he 
did on the grounds that his theory correctly explained the similarity between the Western 
coastline of Africa and the Eastern coastline of South America. 
How would epistemists respond to this episode? They would say that Wegener’s 
contribution paved the way for the advent of the theory of plate tectonics in the 1960s. The 
two theories share the key assumption that continents move around. The main difference 
between them is that only the theory of plate tectonics specifies how continents, massive 
things, move around. Thus, the means-end thesis can also be utilized to defend the epistemic 
approach from Dellsén’s objection involving Wegener’s continental drift theory. 
The foregoing examples of Einstein and Wegener illustrate that understanding 
sometimes acts as a vehicle to arrive at knowledge. Einstein showed how the kinetic theory 
was related to Brownian motion, and Wegener showed how the continental drift theory was 
related to the similarity between the two coastlines. They showed how some propositions are 
related to one another, thereby making preparations for the arrival of knowledge in the 
subsequent researches. 
Finally, let me elucidate a noteworthy implication of Dellsén’s stripping understanding 
of justification. This impoverished notion of understanding implies that understanding does 
not entitle us to make any inference about the world. To use the Einstein example, suppose 
that Einstein understood Brownian motion in terms of the kinetic theory, and that he was not 
justified in believing that the kinetic theory was true, and that Brownian motion was real. 
Under these conditions, he would not have been entitled to infer, for example, that water is 
composed of molecules. Thus, if understanding is devoid of justification, we are only entitled 
to infer some propositions from what we understand, without having any idea whether they 
correctly reflect the world or not. 
 
4. Is Knowledge Sufficient for Scientific Progress? 
Dellsén contends that in science there are cases in which there is an increase in knowledge, 
but there is no increase in understanding and no scientific progress. In other words, what is 
sufficient for scientific progress is not increasing knowledge but increasing understanding. I 
spell out and criticize his argument for this contention in this section. 
Dellsén says that “knowledge is not sufficient for understanding because understanding 
involves a holistic cognitive state that goes beyond having knowledge of individual 
propositions” (2016a: 76). For example, “I may know the length of a flagpole’s shadow, the 
flagpole’s height, the position of the sun, and the rectilinear propagation of light, and yet fail 
to grasp how to explain or predict the length of the flagpole’s shadow” (2016a: 75). In other 
words, I may know that an explanandum and explanantia are true, but not understand the 
explanandum in terms of the explanantia. 
     This example, however, does not show that knowledge is not sufficient for 
understanding. You do not understand why the shadow is of a certain length simply because 
you do not have the inferential knowledge necessary to see how the length of the shadow is 
related to the length of the flagpole, the position of the sun, and the rectilinear propagation of 
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light. Once you know how the explanandum follows from the explanantia, you will acquire 
the understanding of the explanandum in terms of the explanantia. In short, if you have all the 
relevant knowledge, you will have the relevant understanding. 
Noetists would object that even if it is true that understanding requires inferential 
knowledge, it does not show that it is impossible to have knowledge without understanding 
(referee). Knowledge of the individual facts does not constitute understanding, even if 
inferential knowledge is additionally required for understanding. The claim that we can have 
knowledge without understanding seems all that Dellsén needs. The crucial question for 
scientific progress is whether acquiring knowledge of the individual explanantia and the 
explanandum without acquiring the inferential knowledge of how the explanandum follows 
from the explanantia always constitutes scientific progress. 
It would be interesting to see what example noetists can come up with to show that 
even if there is all the relevant knowledge, there can be no relevant understanding. In addition, 
epistemists would distinguish between significant and insignificant knowledge. The 
knowledge of individual facts might be relatively insignificant, but the combination of the 
knowledge with the inferential knowledge might be relatively significant. The epistemic 
approach stands, even if the acquisition of insignificant knowledge does not constitute 
scientific progress, or constitutes insignificant scientific progress. This point will become 
clearer in the course of examining Dellsén’s following objection to the epistemic approach. 
Dellsén argues that “there are non-progressive episodes in which knowledge of theories 
or phenomena is accumulated while there is no increase in scientific understanding” (2016a: 
77). In other words, there can be an accumulation of knowledge without any scientific 
progress or increase in understanding. Suppose that scientists gather data about childbirth 
rates and stork populations around Berlin, and that there is a statistical correlation between 
the two. Despite this correlation, our intuition says that “this is not a case of scientific 
progress” (2016a: 78). Gathering such data is not a progressive episode because the 
accumulation of such trivial knowledge is a symptom of degenerate science: 
 
However, a scientific practice organized around accumulating trivial knowledge of this kind 
would seem to be a paradigm example of degenerate science. Note, for example, that no self-
respecting scientific journal would publish results of this kind, except as a parody. Similarly, 
research proposals outlining investigations of these sorts would not be taken seriously by any 
scientific funding agency. (Dellsén, 2016a: 79) 
 
From the noetic point of view, it is not surprising why funding agencies and scientific 
journals would not be interested in the data about childbirth rates and stork populations. The 
correlation “is useless for understanding the natural world” (Dellsén, 2016a: 78). Thus, the 
noetic approach can explain, while the epistemic approach cannot, why there is no scientific 
progress in this case. 
A similar criticism, however, can be leveled at the noetic approach. Suppose that you 
submit a research proposal to funding agencies. The proposal outlines explanations of why 
one million individuals have the numbers of hairs on their heads that they have. For example, 
Alice has 1,020 hairs on her head because she had 1,030 hairs, but lost 10 hairs while taking a 
shower. Bob has 1,000 hairs on his head because he had 1,001 hairs, but just pulled a gray 
one out. Once your research is completed, there will be one million such explanations. Your 
research will yield understandings of why one million individuals have the numbers of hairs 
that they have, but will impress neither funding agencies nor scientific journals. 
Noetists would reply that we should distinguish between significant and insignificant 
understandings. Funding agencies and scientific journals are interested in significant 
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understandings, but not in insignificant ones. So they are not interested in the understandings 
of why the one million individuals have the numbers of hairs that they have. On the noetic 
approach, however, scientific progress consists in increasing significant understanding, but 
not in increasing insignificant understanding. Increasing insignificant understanding 
constitutes no scientific progress or constitutes at best insignificant scientific progress. The 
noetic approach is refuted not when insignificant understanding does not make any difference 
to scientific progress but when significant understanding does not make any difference to 
scientific progress. 
Epistemists, however, would say the same thing about Dellsén’s objection that 
collecting the data about the childbirth rates and the stork populations does not count as 
scientific progress. We should distinguish between significant and insignificant knowledge. 
Funding agencies and scientific journals are interested in significant knowledge, but not in 
insignificant knowledge. So they are not interested in the data. On the epistemic approach, 
however, scientific progress consists in increasing significant knowledge, but not in 
increasing insignificant knowledge. Increasing insignificant knowledge constitutes no 
scientific progress or constitutes at best insignificant scientific progress. The epistemic 
approach is confuted not when insignificant knowledge does not make any difference to 
scientific progress but when significant knowledge does not make any difference to scientific 
progress. 
 
5. Idealizations  
Many scientific theories involve idealizations, i.e., they distort some factors and ignore others 
to make target systems tractable. Since those theories do not correctly represent their target 
systems, they are false. Regarding idealized theories, Dellsén raises two interesting objections 
against the epistemic approach. I reply to them in this section. 
First, Dellsén says that “the epistemic account also (incorrectly) implies that minimalist 
idealizations ought to abate as science progresses, since there would be no point in having 
idealized theories from a purely epistemic point of view when non-idealized versions of these 
theories have been made available” (2016a: 81). Epistemists, however, would reply that a 
non-idealized theory might be useless to generate observational knowledge. We should 
consider the increase and the decrease in observational knowledge when we determine 
whether idealizations are beneficial or detrimental to the accumulation of knowledge. Thus, 
theoretical knowledge is not the only kind of knowledge that we should take into account in 
determining whether scientific progress is made. 
Second, Dellsén says that “since idealized theories are not true, the epistemic account 
(incorrectly) implies that no progress is made when one generates minimalist idealizations, at 
least not when more accurate, non-idealized theories are available” (2016a: 81). Epistemists, 
however, would reply that the generation of idealized theories counts as progress, given that 
they facilitate inferences about observables, and that those inferences are accompanied by an 
accumulation of observational knowledge. In addition, they generate what I call approximate 
theoretical knowledge, given that they, although false, are approximately true.5 Generating 
approximate theoretical knowledge is better for scientific progress than not generating such 
knowledge at all. 
Moreover, noetists need the notion of approximation as epistemists do. Suppose that 
scientists performed experiments and obtained data about a given target, and that the data 
                                           
5 Approximate knowledge concerns an approximately true proposition. Suppose, for example, that I know that 
Alice is 170.1cm. Then, I approximately know that she is 170cm. 
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slightly deviate from the expected data. Noetists would not say that scientists have made no 
progress on the grounds that the actual data only approximate the expected data. They would 
rather say that scientists made progress on the grounds that they understand the target more 
than before as a result of obtaining such imperfect data. 
Noetists would reply that although they also need the notion of approximation, it may 
be easier for them to incorporate this notion into their account since according to them, 
understanding requires acceptance rather than belief (referee). The referee’s idea seems to be 
that instead of believing that the actual data are approximately true, scientists can accept that 
they are true. 
     The referee’s suggestion indicates that on the noetist account, scientists can merely 
accept not only scientific theories but also data. As I argued earlier, however, if scientists 
merely accept data, they are opening themselves to the charge that they have fabricated the 
data, and to the charge that their explanations, predictions, and understandings do not reflect 
the world. To merely accept data is to obfuscate the connection between cognitive agents and 
the world. 
What attitude should we take towards a theory or model that involves idealizations? A 
referee suggests that acceptance, as opposed to belief, is a reasonable attitude since we know 
that the theory or model involves falsehoods but believe that these falsehoods do not affect 
the intended predictions or explanations. Epistemists, however, would take an alternative 
attitude, viz., believing that an idealized theory is, although not completely true, 
approximately true. This epistemic attitude would be endorsed by Stathis Psillos (1999: 276) 
who claims that the ideal gas law, although not completely true, is approximately true.  
 
6. Simplicity 
Scientists make progress when they choose a simple theory over a complex one. Dellsén 
argues that the noetic approach can, while the epistemic approach cannot, account for such 
progress. This section aims to defend the epistemic approach from this objection. 
     Suppose that T1 and T2 are empirically equivalent, but that T1 is simple whereas T2 is 
complex, and that simplicity is not an epistemic, but a pragmatic, virtue. The epistemic 
approach implies that no progress is made when scientists choose T1 over T2, for “the amount 
of knowledge gained by coming to know T1 is (by any measure) exactly the same as the 
amount of knowledge gained by coming to know T2” (Dellsén, 2016a: 81). By contrast, the 
noetic approach implies that progress is made when scientists choose T1 over T2, for a 
“simpler theory enables us to explain and predict aspects of the world that would be more 
difficult or even impossible to explain and predict with a more complex theory” (Dellsén, 
2016a: 81). It follows that “the simpler T1 would provide us with more understanding than 
the more complex T2” (Dellsén, 2016a: 81).  
Dellsén thinks that T1 gives rise to more understanding than T2, not because he thinks 
that T1 has a broader explanatory and predictive scope than T2, but because he thinks that it is 
psychologically easier to derive observational consequences from T1 than from T2. For 
example, while it takes less than a second to derive an observational consequence from T1, it 
takes more than a year to derive an observational consequence from T2. Given that deriving 
observational consequences is required to explain and predict phenomena, scientists can 
explain and predict phenomena more efficiently with T1 than with T2. It follows that T1 
contributes more than T2 to an increase in understanding, although T1 and T2 are empirically 
equivalent. This seems to be what Dellsén has in mind. 
Epistemists have a theoretical resource to diffuse this objection. To say that it is 
psychologically easier to derive observational consequences from T1 than T2 implies that 
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scientists can generate observational knowledge more efficiently with T1 than with T2. It 
follows that T1 contributes more than T2 to the accumulation of knowledge, although T1 and 
T2 are empirically equivalent. Therefore, choosing T1 over T2 constitutes scientific progress. 
What can we learn from the preceding discussion? The empirical equivalence of T1 and 
T2 does not mean that T1 and T2 generate observational knowledge at the same rate any more 
than it means that they generate understanding at the same rate. It is one thing that they are 
equivalent; it is another that they generate knowledge and understanding with equal 
efficiency. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Dellsén argues that understanding requires not belief but acceptance, that scientific 
understanding arises from correct explanations and predictions, and that scientific progress 
consists in increasing understanding. I objected that when scientists explain and predict 
phenomena, they believe at least that the propositions that concern the phenomena are true. If 
they merely accept the propositions, their peers might suspect that they have fabricated data, 
and that their explanation, prediction, and understanding do not reflect the world. It follows 
that understanding, as defined by Dellsén, cannot capture scientific progress.  
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